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I.

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS

The state recites the sordid testimony from Mr. Patterson’s trial. But this
discussion ignores the premise of his postconviction claims: he is actually
innocent of the charges and was convicted only because attorney errors
prevented the jury from getting a complete understanding of what happened.
However, due to the nature of these errors, Mr. Patterson was unaware
of them until new counsel was appointed to represent him. Tragically, by that
time his ability to challenge these errors was compromised by his appellate
attorney’s misadvice about how to proceed in postconviction. The State
objects, repeatedly claiming that Mr. Patterson received correct advice. But it
does so by ignoring how a lay petitioner would reasonably understand the
unequivocal advice counsel gave in writing and in person: you’ve exhausted
your claims, there’s nothing to gain by filing a state petition, go straight to
federal court, and do it within a year.
It is undisputed that Mr. Patterson filed a timely pro se petition in federal
court, and he also filed a petition in state court within a year of having counsel
appointed, who discovered new evidence that Mr. Patterson could not
reasonably have obtained as an indigent, pro se inmate.
Had this evidence been obtained at trial, Mr. Patterson could have
demonstrated his innocence. Records from DCFS refute his ex-wife’s firm
testimony that she was the one who requested a divorce (these records confirm
that Mr. Patterson requested it), and expert testimony would have
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demonstrated for the jury how E.H.’s highly inconsistent testimony was
evidence of improper influence and post-hoc fabrication.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The True Breadth of the Great Writ.
The core principle animating Mr. Patterson’s opening brief is simple: the

Utah Constitution grants Utah courts the power to grant extraordinary writs,
include the Great Writ of habeas corpus. This Court has been clear that the
legislature cannot diminish its writ power. Opening Brief at 10. So, unless Mr.
Patterson’s claims can be heard under an exception to the PCRA’s time bar,
this Court must confront the conflict between its own assertion that its writ
powers are inviolable and the PCRA’s assertion that it is the sole source of
postconviction relief.
The State resists that conclusion. As its brief tells it, there is no
conflict—the Great Writ is misnamed and toothless in postconviction matters.
Essentially, the State argues that this Court’s past use of the Great Writ was
ultra vires, and now the PCRA has restored the proper order, preventing courts
from providing any relief without its permission.
The State is wrong about the history of the Great Writ. Since even before
Utah’s founding, the people of Utah have used habeas to correct injustice
outside the narrow circumstances to which the State would confine it. That
point colors this whole appeal.
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1.

Utah’s original Writ of Habeas Corpus reached well beyond matters of
jurisdiction.

The State’s central argument against the Great Writ is that in
postconviction matters, it was only a check on jurisdiction. According to the
State, it was not until Thompson, some 40 years after ratification, that the Writ
was “expanded . . . to incorporate post-appeal review of a conviction or
sentence for constitutional error.” State’s Brief at 68-71.
But the State’s briefing belies this conclusion. Its cases show this Court
used habeas to correct issues beyond jurisdiction. For example, in its discussion
of In re McKee, the State claims this Court examined “the entire judicial regime
upon which the prosecutions proceeded to determine if ‘the petitioner was
tried and convicted’ under ‘legal proceedings.’” State’s Brief at 70 (citing In re
McKee, 57 P. 23, 27 (Utah 1899)). That exaggerates some. The issue raised in
McKee was whether the petitioner “was tried and convicted without due
process of law” because he had only eight people on his jury. In re McKee, 57 P.
at 23. That is not something that affects a court’s jurisdiction to hear a criminal
case. Otherwise, defendants could never be tried before a judge or stipulate to a
number of jurors less than what the law requires. McKee shows that habeas, as
originally understood, was not limited to jurisdictional issues—at least as we
understand them today.
The same holds true for In re Maxwell, another case the State cites. The
Maxwell petitioner raised the same jury claims as the petitioner in McKee. See In
re Maxwell, 57 P. 412, 413 (1899). He also argued that his conviction was illegal

3

because he was charged by information, not indictment. Id. Again, these are
not claims that go to the jurisdiction of a court to hear a case.
The State doesn’t even touch Saville v. Corless. In that case, two
petitioners received habeas relief based on three separate arguments that the
statute under which they were convicted was invalid. See Opening Brief at 36
(discussing Saville, 151 P. 51, 51-53 (Utah 1915)). That sort of claim does not
question the “entire judicial regime” under which the pair were tried. Nor does
the constitutionality of a statute have anything to do with a court’s jurisdiction.
See State v. Norris, 2007 UT 5, ¶¶8-9, 152 P.3d 305, reversing 2004 UT App 267,
97 P.3d 732.
The cases just cited only begin to scratch the historical record. True,
there are few successes to report—just as there are few successes in modern
postconviction. Still, there are more early cases in which petitioners challenged
their convictions in habeas proceedings and had this Court hear those claims
on the merits, all of them without a semblance of what we would understand
as a jurisdictional challenge. See, e.g., In re Monk, 50 P. 810, 811 (Utah 1897); In
re De Camp, 49 P. 823, 823-24 (Utah 1897); Roberts v. Howells, 62 P. 892, 892-93
(Utah 1900); Rasmussen v. Zundel, 248 P. 135, 137 (Utah 1926). Beyond those,
there are surely countless other cases that ended without an appeal, leaving
almost no trace of their existence.
So, despite what cases like Thompson may have said about the reach of
the Great Writ, in practice, just after the Utah Constitution was ratified, the
Writ was frequently used to examine constitutional claims unrelated to
jurisdiction.
4

But why would this Court have said habeas was originally limited to
jurisdictional challenges if, in reality, it was not? This conflict can be attributed
to an evolution in how jurisdiction was understood near the time of Utah’s
founding. And this evolution was on display in the Territory of Utah’s
prosecution of Lorenzo Snow, a prominent leader (and later President) of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Some background is necessary to fully appreciate Mr. Snow’s case. After
it made Utah a territory, Congress made ever-increasing efforts to eradicate
polygamy. The first push came with the Morrill Act, which made it an offense
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment to “marry any other person,
whether married or single, in a Territory of the United States.” Morrill Act, ch.
126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862); Edwin Firmage and Richard Mangrum, Zion in the
Courts, 131 (Univ. Ill. Press 2001) [hereinafter “Zion in the Courts”]. But the law
was difficult to enforce. For one thing, the Utah territory, like the territories
around it, did not keep marriage records. Zion in the Courts, 149. More
significantly, “Mormon weddings were often performed in temples or the
Endowment House, which were open only to faithful Mormons,” so willing
witnesses were hard to find. Id. Altogether these conditions made it difficult to
prosecute polygamist marriages. Id. at 160.
In response to these troubles, Congress passed the Edmunds Act, which
created the new offense of “unlawful cohabitation.” Id. at 161; Edmunds Act,
ch. 47, 22 Stat. 31, §3 (1882). This created a new misdemeanor, punishable by
up to six months in prison, that prohibited “cohabit[ing] with more than one
woman.” Id. Under this new statute, proof that sexual intercourse had
5

occurred or even that some marriage ceremony had been performed was
unnecessary. It was enough that a man had been “living and dwelling with
more than one woman as if they were married.” United State v. Cannon, 7 P.
369, 374-75 (Utah 1885).
While the new offense resulted in many successful prosecutions, it had
one drawback: the maximum punishment was just six months. But that did not
stop creative prosecutors. To increase a defendant’s punishment, prosecutors
would bring a separate charge of cohabitation for discrete time periods, e.g.,
charging a defendant separately for each year, month, or even each day in
violation. Zion in the Courts, 178-79.
The first test case for this charging practice came in the prosecution of
Lorenzo Snow. In December 1885, he was charged in three separate
indictments with unlawful cohabitation with the same women—one charge for
the year 1883, another for 1884, and one for 1885. He was first tried on the
1885 charge and convicted. At his second trial, for the charge covering 1884, he
argued that his prior conviction barred further prosecution. The district court
rejected his defense in that trial and again at his third trial for the charge
covering 1883. Zion in the Courts, 179.
Mr. Snow appealed all three convictions. See United States v. Snow, 9 P.
501 (Utah 1886); 9 P. 686 (Utah 1886); 9 P. 697 (Utah 1886). Only the second
appeal discusses his prior-conviction defense. This Court’s territorial
predecessor recognized the issue as “probably the most important in the case”
but believed there was not “an abundance of authority either for or against”
Mr. Snow’s contention that he was improperly charged. Snow, 9 P. at 693.
6

Ultimately, though, it was persuaded that the separate charges were permissible
and upheld the convictions. Id. at 696.
Mr. Snow sought review from the U.S. Supreme Court, but his petition
was rebuffed. Under the statutes then in effect, Congress had not granted the
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review criminal proceedings by appeal or writ of
error. And for that reason, Mr. Snow’s writs of error were dismissed. Snow v.
United States, 118 U.S. 346, 347-54 (1886). But in the course of the decision, the
Supreme Court twice mentioned statutes that would allow it to review writs
of habeas corpus. Id. at 348-49.
Whether or not that was a suggestion, Mr. Snow’s next move was to seek
a writ of habeas corpus. On October 22, 1886, Mr. Snow’s attorney, Franklin
S. Richards, filed his petition in the territorial court. It alleged that Mr. Snow
was “being punished twice for one and same offense,” and sought a discharge
from custody on that ground. “Petition of Habeas Corpus,” Deseret Evening
News (October 22, 1886).1 When the petition was heard, the territorial
prosecutor claimed the court had no jurisdiction to grant the writ, especially
since Mr. Snow had been convicted in a different district. “Writ Denied,”
Deseret News (October 27, 1886).2 The district court denied the writ. Id.
Mr. Snow then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Ex parte Snow, 120
U.S. 274, 280 (1887). On appeal, the government argued that Mr. Snow was

1

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6vf0zjh/23181922.

2

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6931nq0/2667786.
7

not entitled to relief in habeas proceedings. It argued that the district court had
jurisdiction over the charges, including jurisdiction to hear his challenges to the
successive prosecutions, so the Supreme Court could review those issues only
by writ of error, and not via habeas. Id. at 281.
The Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument. Jumping to the
heart of the matter, it determined the territorial supreme court had incorrectly
interpreted the cohabitation statute: it defined a continuing offense, not one
that could be divided up arbitrarily. Id. at 281-85. Based on this interpretation
of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded the district court in the criminal
proceeding had “no jurisdiction to inflict a punishment” for duplicitous charges.
Id. at 285 (emphasis added). The conviction and sentence were “illegal,” and it
was proper to give Mr. Snow relief through the Great Writ. Id. at 285-87.
To say the court lacked jurisdiction to impose that punishment is, of
course, quite different from how we view the issue now. Under present law, the
error in Mr. Snow’s case would be viewed as a double jeopardy violation.
Though serious, it would have nothing to do with jurisdiction. 3 But this is not
how jurisdiction was understood then. As the Supreme Court put it just two
years later, “the court had authority over the case, but we held that it had no
authority to give judgment against the prisoner. He was protected by a

Under present law, double jeopardy claims are waivable. See United
States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569-74 (1989). And if they are waivable, by
necessity, a double jeopardy violation does not limit a court’s jurisdiction, since
jurisdiction cannot be waived. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶¶34-35, 100 P.3d
1177.
3
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constitutional provision, securing to him a fundamental right. It was not a case
of mere error in law, but a case of denying to a person a constitutional right.”
Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 184 (1889).
In other words, at this period of time, when courts spoke about
jurisdiction, they did not have in mind only subject-matter jurisdiction as we
understand it today. While the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was a
sufficient basis to grant habeas relief, it was not the only one. Instead, the
contemporary view of jurisdiction included not only the power to hear a case,
but also the power act in a case. And because the Constitution denied courts
power to perform certain acts, it was understood to be a check on their
jurisdiction. Thus, if a court acted contrary to the Constitution, it was without
jurisdiction, and the resulting judgment could be challenged by habeas.
This view was confirmed in another Utah habeas case that followed
close on the heels of Ex parte Snow. That case, Ex parte Nielson, again involved
the propriety of multiple charges. Coming after Ex parte Snow, prosecutors
could charge cohabitation only once, so instead they charged the defendant
Hans Nielson with cohabitation and adultery. Ex parte Nielson, 131 U.S. at 17677. He was tried on the cohabitation charge first, and pleaded guilty. When he
was arraigned on the adultery charge, he entered a plea of former conviction,
arguing that the cohabitation and adultery charges were “one and the same
offense and not divisible.” Id. at 177-78. The prosecutor demurred to the plea,
and the district court sustained the demurrer. Mr. Nielson was subsequently
convicted and sentenced to additional imprisonment. Id. at 178. He did not
appeal to the territorial supreme court. Instead, within days of sentencing, he
9

filed a habeas petition arguing that “he was being punished twice for one and
the same offense,” so “the court had no jurisdiction to pass judgment against
him upon more than one of the indictments.” Id. When the district court
denied his petition, he appealed to the Supreme Court. Id.
On this appeal, the Supreme Court leaped straight into the jurisdiction
question. While the Court acknowledged that generally it was not permissible
to collaterally attack a judgment of conviction, there were exceptions to the
rule. By then, the Court said, it was already the law that the constitutionality
of a statute could be challenged on collateral review because if a statute was
unconstitutional, it would deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear a charge
under the statute. Id. at 182–83 (citing Ex parte Coy, 127 U. S. 731 (1888)).
From this, the Supreme Court reasoned:
It is difficult to see why a conviction and punishment under
an unconstitutional law is more violative of a person’s
constitutional rights than an unconstitutional conviction
and punishment under a valid law. In the first case, it is
true, the court has no authority to take cognizance of the
case; but in the other it has no authority to render judgment
against the defendant.
Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added). In light of its later conclusion that the two
crimes were one and the same offense, the Supreme Court held that Mr.
Nielson’s sentence on the adultery conviction “was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court, because it was against an express provision of the constitution which
bounds and limits all jurisdiction.” Id. at 185.

10

Read with a modern understanding of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement does not make sense. Under modern jurisprudence,
constitutional errors in the course of a criminal proceeding do not deprive a
court of subject matter jurisdiction. But at the time of Ex parte Snow and Ex
parte Nielson, jurisdiction was synonymous with ‘power’ or ‘authority.’ And
with that contemporary understanding in mind, the conflict between what this
Court said and what it did disappears. A habeas petition, though nominally
attacking jurisdiction, in reality reached errors that deprived courts of the
authority or power to enter a judgment. Consistent with that understanding, a
respected treatise on jurisdiction from this period declared:
[I]f the defendant being placed on trial was denied the right
of counsel guarantied him by the constitution there is no
rightful conviction for he has had no trial and the
conviction only follows a trial. So if a defendant was
refused a subpoena for witnesses in his favor or refused the
right of having the indictment read to him or any
constitutional immunity the sentence is void. Such
immunities are part of the mode of trial and their refusal
goes to the power of the court as much as if sentenced without
being indicted at all.
BROWN ON JURISDICTION, §103 (“When judgment is void and when voidable”)
(pp. 280-81) (1891) (emphasis added).4
https://books.google.com/books?id=E5gEAAAAYAAJ. The second
edition of this treatise was issued in 1901. It gives the same view on habeas and
jurisdiction. See BROWN ON JURISDICTION, §103 (pp. 378-79) (1901), available at
https://books.google.com/books?id=nKYzAQAAMAAJ. This Court
frequently relied on this treatise. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 140 P. 218, 220 (Utah
1914); Snyder v. Pike, 83 P. 692, 694 (Utah 1905).
4
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Thus, despite the frequent declaration from this Court and others that
the Great Writ was only a check on jurisdiction, in reality it was commonly
used to correct what we now understand to be constitutional errors in criminal
convictions. Under this view, any problem with Mr. Patterson proceeding
under habeas is readily cured by adding the word “jurisdiction” to all of his
claims. Put otherwise, his claims are proper because the district court lacked
jurisdiction to punish Mr. Patterson in violation of the Constitution.
2.

At Utah’s founding, the public understood the Great Writ to have
broad reach.

Because of the issue and the people involved, the proceedings in Ex parte
Snow and Ex parte Nielson were well known to the people of Utah at the time of
Utah’s founding. Newspapers of the time confirm it.
Already cited above are two articles that described the portion of the writ
proceedings in Mr. Snow’s case that occurred in Utah. As the case made its
way to the U.S. Supreme Court, more news articles followed. The Deseret
News criticized the district court for failing to issue the writ at all, even if just
to deny it. It was believed that this might frustrate review by the Supreme
Court. “Another Judicial Straw,” Deseret News (Nov. 3, 1886). 5 Another
editorial advised readers to exercise “a little more patience” as they waited for
the Supreme Court to hear the appeal. “The Snow Habeas Corpus Case,”
Deseret Evening News (Nov. 26, 1886). When Mr. Snow’s attorney, Franklin S.

5

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s65b0x14/2667860.
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Richards, left Utah to argue the case, it made the news. “A Very Important
Case,” Deseret Evening News, (Dec. 27, 1886). 6 And after the case was argued,
the Deseret Evening News provided a lengthy discussion of the argument
itself. “Law and Logic: Arguments in the Case of Lorenzo Snow,” Deseret
Evening News (January 29, 1887).7
Once the case was decided, news of the decision made it into every
newspaper. A short discussion of the result was announced on the day it was
issued. “Reversed!,” Deseret Evening News (Feb. 7, 1887);8 “The Decision,”
Ogden Herald, (Feb. 7, 1887).9 The next day just about every paper discussed it.
See “The Great Topic,” Ogden Herald (Feb. 8, 1887);10 “A Paralyzer,” Salt Lake
Herald-Republican (Feb. 8, 1887); 11 “The Snow Case,” Salt Lake Democrat (Feb.
8, 1887); 12 “The Snow Decision,” Salt Lake Tribune (Feb. 8, 1887). 13 Further
discussion of the decision and its consequences followed in the weeks after.
See, e.g., “The Last Assault on Mr. Dickson,” Salt Lake Tribune (Feb. 12,
6

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6w41wc1/23182213.

7

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s62k0c10/23184027.
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https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s65b42nc/23184067.
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https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6qz3brt/7403223.
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https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6m62m28/7403242.
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https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6bk2jxz/10726968.
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https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6543stv/9891461.
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https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6r5110v/13158248.
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1887); 14 “In the Snow Case,” Salt Lake Herald-Republican (Feb. 13, 1887);15
“Despoiling the Mormons,” Deseret News (Feb. 16, 1887); 16 “The Scope of the
Decision,” Deseret News (Feb. 16, 1887). 17 And eventually papers printed the
Supreme Court’s decision in full. See, e.g., “The Snow Case,” Salt Lake HeraldRepublican (Feb. 18, 1887). 18
But while press coverage of the Snow decision saturated the Utah
territory, none of it focused on the habeas aspect of the case. Even the Salt
Lake Tribune, then a stridently anti-Mormon publication, was quiet on that
front. Sure, it threw other barbs. For example, one of its articles on the Snow
decision was titled “Releasing the Cohabs.” That same article described one
person who benefited from the Snow decision as a “child beater” with a
“decidedly tough appearance.” See “Releasing the Cohabs,” Salt Lake Tribune
(Feb. 10, 1887).19 But while the Tribute criticized Mormons, it never suggested
the Snow decision was an improper or even unusual exercise of habeas
authority.
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The subsequent habeas proceedings for Mr. Nielson made smaller waves
in the press, but they were still well-covered. Like Mr. Snow, Mr. Nielson was
represented by Franklin S. Richards. His departure to D.C. to argue the case
was announced. “Gone to Washington,” Utah Enquirer (Mar. 29, 1889).20 The
briefing was described for the public. See, e.g., “The Nielson Case: Before the
U.S. Supreme Court,” Utah Enquirer (Apr. 30, 1889). 21 The argument was
described. “The Neilsen [sic] Case,” Deseret Weekly (May 18, 1889).22 And once
the Supreme Court decision was announced, it was widely discussed. See
“Only One Punishment,” Ogden Semi-Weekly Standard (May 14, 1889);23
“The Nielsen Case,” Utah Enquirer (May 17, 1889);24 “An Erroneous
Impression,” Utah Enquirer (May 20, 1889).25 Again, though, throughout this
coverage, there is no comment about this being a novel or improper use of the
Great Writ.
Looking back more than one hundred and twenty years, it is impossible
to exactly define the original public meaning of the Utah Constitution’s grant
of habeas authority to courts. Yet, after Mr. Snow’s and Mr. Nielson’s cases,

20

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6pr900q/1399401.

21

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6db94z9/1399897.

22

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6nz936d/2675887.

23

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6766gq7/6239698.

24

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6mw3m6b/1400235.

25

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6h42vjt/1400264.
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the courts and people of Utah were well familiar with the essence of the Great
Writ, and understood it could reach constitutional issues that today we would
not call jurisdictional. This history demonstrates that cases like In re McKee, In
re Maxwell, and Saville v. Corless were neither an aberration nor an innovation.
The results there are consistent with what the public understood and intended when
it granted habeas authority to the judiciary in Utah’s Constitution.
3.

The State’s historical argument focuses on the wrong part of the Utah
Constitution while ignoring territorial history.

The State’s only historical analysis focuses on the Constitutional
Convention’s debate on how to phrase Utah’s Suspension Clause. Because it
mirrors the federal Suspension Clause, the State concludes the intent was to
adopt a not-so-great writ—one that was practically toothless for postconviction
claims. There are several flaws with this analysis.
The biggest problem is that it fails to recognize a key structural difference
between the state and federal constitutions. The federal Constitution mentions
habeas corpus only in its Suspension Clause. This has led to disagreement over
whether that clause implicitly guarantees a right to the Great Writ, whether
there is some other source to that right, or whether the writ could be eliminated
altogether because inferior courts were optional and did not have general
jurisdiction. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337-40 & n.5 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). No such confusion is possible with the Utah Constitution. Its
drafters included an explicit grant of habeas power to this Court and to district
courts, gave both original jurisdiction to grant such writs, and required the
creation of district courts. Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 4, 5, & 7 (1896).
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And while the judicial article of the Utah Constitution has changed over the
years, those core attributes remain. See Opening Brief at 10 n.1. Because of this
structural difference between the two constitutions, the State’s comparison is
based on a false premise.
But even if that fact were ignored, the State portrays the debate that
occurred as if it were specifically focused on the breadth of the writ. That is
not true. The exclusive focus on the debate was over who may suspend the
Great Writ and on what conditions. There were some who wanted the state
legislature to be in control and to set the conditions. Others wanted the
executive branch to have the power, reasoning that “it could not escape the
notice of anybody, or any person in the city or State when there was rebellion,
or when the State was being invaded by foreign enemies.” 1 Official Report of
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 253-54 (1898). But while the
delegates frequently lauded the Great Writ, there was no discussion whatsoever
of what breadth they expected it to have. There was certainly no hint that they
wanted its reach diminished.
A better indication of what they intended is found in the historical use of
the Great Writ in the Territory of Utah. As discussed above, just a few short
years before the Utah Constitution was drafted, the Great Writ was used to
overturn the cumulative convictions of Mr. Snow and Mr. Nielsen based on
constitutional issues, not jurisdictional defects. Besides the fact that these
proceedings were relatively fresh in the public mind, they bore special
relevance to the convention. Those two petitioners were both represented by
Franklin S. Richards in the territorial district court and on appeal to the U.S.
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Supreme Court. The same man served as delegate to the Utah Convention. 2
Official Report 1883. With his background, it is unlikely Mr. Richards would
stand silent if the new state’s writ of habeas corpus was going to be narrower
than the writ his clients just took advantage of.
4.

Before statehood, the public understood the Great Writ to reach
postconviction issues. That is what they got after statehood.

It is easy to find early cases from this Court that say habeas concerns
itself only with jurisdiction. And it is easy to find later cases, like Thompson,
that suggest the reach of the writ was expanded. But history shows that neither
proposition is true, at least not as we now understand jurisdictional and
constitutional claims.
“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., COMMON LAW 1 (1881). For Utahans, their experience
has been that the Great Writ can correct constitutional errors in
postconviction. Utahans saw that with Mr. Snow and Mr. Nielson. When they
voted to ratify the constitution, they would have understood the Writ to have
that same reach. And in the years immediately after ratification, this Court
considered constitutional postconviction claims under its Writ power, even
granting relief in some cases.
It is that experience that governs, not incorrect statements about the
reach of the Writ caused by confusion about what jurisdiction meant
historically. Since Utah’s founding, the Great Writ has reached postconviction
claims.
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5.

Utah enshrined a modern understanding of this Court’s habeas
authority in the 1984 constitutional amendment.

Whatever this Court concludes about its habeas authority in 1896, the
1984 amendment constitutionalized its writ authority as that authority was
understood at the time of the amendment. And the State acknowledges that by
the time of this amendment, it was firmly settled that habeas reached the type
of constitutional challenges Mr. Patterson raises here. Because this Court had
explicitly held that its writ power included the authority to hear constitutional
challenges to a criminal conviction, that understanding was codified, even
constitutionalized, in the 1984 amendment.
A legislative act that uses a legal term this Court has authoritatively
interpreted carries the meaning the Court previously gave it. See, e.g.,
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 430 P.3d 612, 617 (Utah 2018); Christensen v. Indus.
Commn., 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982). Under the “prior construction canon,”
“where a legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions
unamended, or re-enacts them without change, the legislature is presumed to
have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions
of the statute and to have adopted them as consistent with its own intent.”
Christensen, 642 P.2d at 756. Put otherwise, where a legal term in a statute “has
been authoritatively interpreted by the highest court in a jurisdiction,” “a ‘later
version’ of a statute ‘perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward’
the established judicial interpretation.” MacDonald, 430 P.3d at 617 (quoting
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 322 (2012)).
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Although this is a canon of statutory construction, its logic applies here
with equal force. Whatever habeas authority this Court had in 1896, by 1984
this court had authoritatively held that its habeas authority extended to
constitutional challenges. When the legislature enshrined this Court’s authority
to issue “all extraordinary writs,” including the writ of habeas corpus, it did so
in light of what that authority entailed at the time of the amendment. Had the
legislature been dissatisfied with the scope of this authority, it could have
narrowed or restricted that authority through the amendment process. But it
did not do that. Instead, the 1984 amendment constitutionalized the
understanding of this Court’s habeas authority that existed at that time, which
undeniably included the authority to vacate unconstitutional criminal
convictions.
The better view is that this authority has existed since the founding, but
whatever the scope of the historical authority, the 1984 amendment ensured
that this Court would have the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus as that
authority was understood at the time of the amendment.
B.

The PCRA is not valid regulation of the Great Writ
Hedging its bets, the State argues that even if Utah’s habeas clause

originally reached postconviction claims, then the PCRA is reasonable
regulation of the habeas process. Its legal support for this proposition is a
string cite to federal and state cases where various time bars have been upheld
in a variety of postconviction regimes. State’s Brief at 75-76. The State asserts
that the PCRA is comparable to these undescribed regimes. It further asserts
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that the PCRA validly regulates the Writ because, as the State opines, the Act’s
“flexible accrual dates and tolling provisions . . . affords petitioners all the
opportunity to present a claim that fairness reasonably requires.” State’s Brief at
79.
The State’s has failed to adequately brief this argument. While it is
undoubtedly true that the various jurisdictions have upheld an assortment of
time limits, the State fails to explain how the logic of those opinions applies to
Utah’s constitution. Do those other jurisdictions have the same history with
the Great Writ as Utah does? What limits are put on suspension of habeas in
those jurisdictions? Are the courts in those jurisdictions granted habeas
authority by their constitutions, or by statute? And if by the constitution, is the
habeas writ in those jurisdictions as broad as Utah’s has been historically? And
what exceptions exist within those jurisdiction to their postconviction bars?
Without addressing these questions, the State cannot show how the decisions it
cites are relevant to Utah’s writ.
For example, take the cited federal decisions upholding the regulation of
federal habeas. While the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
time and procedural bars, it has also ruled that relief can be granted despite
those bars. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (cause and prejudice to overcome procedural bar);
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual innocence). So, it is confusing, if not
illogical, for the State to rely on the validity of the federal bars to justify the
validity of the PCRA’s bar, while at the same time arguing that the PCRA
should not be subject to the same exceptions to the bars.
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The State’s most glaring failure is its silence regarding the affirmative
grant of writ power in Utah’s constitution. As explained elsewhere, this Court
and the district courts were granted habeas power in the original constitution.
Though the Great Writ is no longer explicitly named, habeas is one of the
extraordinary writs to which this and the district courts are entitled. Over and
over again, this Court has been strident in its protection of those writ powers.
Just two years ago, this Court quoted a decision from 1908 to reaffirm an
important principle: “[I]t was not within the province of the Legislature to so
modify and enlarge the office of the writ. . . . [W]hatever power was conferred
upon the courts by the Constitution cannot be enlarged or abridged by the
Legislature.” Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶14, 387 P.3d 1040 (quoting State ex rel.
Robinson v. Durand, 104 P. 760, 762-63 (1908)). It then went on to quote Petersen
v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, a habeas case, to say that writ power cannot be
diminished. See id. (quoting Petersen, 907 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Utah 1995)).
The State presents no argument for how the significant restrictions the
PCRA places on postconviction relief do anything but modify, abridge, and
diminish the Court’s habeas writ power. Even Brown is mentioned only in a
footnote in the State’s brief. That footnote suggests that this Court should
overrule Brown—an election case—along with a variety of habeas cases. See
State’s Brief at 72 n.16. It goes without saying that the State has not made its
case that Brown and the cases it cites should be overturned. See Eldridge v.
Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶¶21-22, 345 P.3d 553.
But, assuming for the moment that some regulation is permissible, the
State has failed to show that the PCRA permissibly regulates the Great Writ.
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The State acknowledges that Julian requires flexibility in habeas matters, but it
then uses that word as if it is talismanic, claiming that “flexible accrual dates
and tolling provisions” automatically satisfy Julian’s demands. State’s Brief at
78-79. That ignores a plain reading of Julian.
In Julian, the petitioner was seeking relief on a set of claims more than
six years after this Court had affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See
Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 250 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Julian, 771 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1989)). The petitioner’s claims did not hinge on new evidence but
were focused on an evidentiary question central to his trial. This issue could
have been addressed on direct appeal. Indeed, one of his habeas claims faulted
his appellate counsel for failing to raise it. See id. Nowhere is it suggested that
the petitioner had any obstacle that prevented him from bringing the claims
sooner.
Despite these facts, this Court still held that it could not be barred by a
statute of limitations. While this Court focused on flexibility, it was not with
an eye to accommodate petitioners struggling with procedural barriers.
Instead, this Court focused on its own flexibility to grant relief in appropriate
cases. This Court disapproved of the four-year statute of limitations because it
“remove[d] flexibility and discretion from state judicial procedure, thereby
diminishing the court’s ability to guarantee fairness and equity in particular
cases.” Julian, 966 P.2d at 253 (quoting Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1368
n.18 (Utah App. 1993)) (emphasis added). And it approved of a one-year
statute of limitations only because it included an interests-of-justice exception,
as “proper consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus
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petition will always be in the interests of justice.” Id. at 254. It was in this
context that this Court concluded “that no statute of limitations may be
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition.” Id. “[I]f the proper showing
is made, the mere passage of time can never justify continued imprisonment of
one who has been deprived of fundamental rights.” Id.
Contrary to the State’s assertions, the PCRA does not provide courts the
flexibility that the Great Writ requires. Under the PCRA, the mere passage of
time can justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of
fundamental rights. Under the PCRA, the merits of a claim are irrelevant; all
that matters are the deadlines—which usually cut off relief after one year. Even
if a dead-bang winner claim is filed one day late, the PCRA consigns it to the
trash-heap. In this way, the PCRA impermissibly restricts power that has been
constitutionally granted to the judicial branch. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 253. For
these reasons, the PCRA is not a “reasonable” regulation of the Great Writ.
For the same reasons, it is irrelevant that Rule 65C—this Court’s own
rule—“embraces” the PCRA as the law governing postconviction. See State’s
Brief at 50-51. This Court has declared that “the Writ belongs to the judicial
branch of government” and that the separation of powers provision of the
Utah Constitution requires it to have a potent habeas writ. Hurst v. Cook, 777
P.2d 1029, 1033-34 (1989). It follows that the Court itself would violate the
separation of powers if it ceded to any other branch of government control
over how it can employ the Great Writ. Cf. State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687
(Utah 1977) (“The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others
the essential legislative function with which it is thus vested.”). Exercise of the
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Great Writ is one of the core powers of the courts, reserved to it in the text of
the constitution, so it is nondelegable. See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P. 2d 844,
848 (Utah 1994).
Because this Court’s writ authority is granted to it by the Utah
Constitution, this Court—not the Legislature—must decide how that power
can be used. Under this Court’s previous case law, Mr. Patterson’s diligent
effort should allow his claims to be heard. If review is otherwise unavailable,
his claims should be considered under the courts’ writ power.
C.

Mr. Patterson was improperly advised to go directly to federal
court.
Against this constitutional backdrop, one factual dispute animates this

appeal. It concerns the advice that Mr. Patterson received as his direct appeal
was concluding. Because appellate counsel Ed Wall’s advice included some
correct information about state postconviction, the State argues that Mr.
Patterson was correctly advised and his failure to file on time should not be
excused under any legal theory.
In reality, the advice was incorrect on its face because Mr. Patterson had
not exhausted even the claims Mr. Wall identified because he had not included
them in his appeal to this court.
More importantly, the State fails to acknowledge that Mr. Wall
specifically advised Mr. Patterson twice to go directly to federal court. PCR8889, 207. And one of these times was in an in-person meeting that the State
completely ignores in its briefing. By omitting that point, the State undermines
its whole argument. Cf. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶¶40-44, 326 P.3d 645
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(recognizing that factual arguments are undermined by failure to address key
evidence).
From the point-of-view of a layperson like Mr. Patterson, Mr. Wall’s
specific advice to go directly to federal court puts everything else into
perspective. While it is true Mr. Patterson was informed about the possibility
of state postconviction, to him it was always presented as an irrelevant option.
He had no reason to dwell on it when Mr. Wall, the person who informed him
of its existence, told him to ignore it.
Besides the explicit advice, two other points further signaled to Mr.
Patterson that state postconviction was irrelevant to him. The first is Mr. Wall’s
statement that he could not think of any potential claims that he would raise in
state postconviction. PCR201. To Mr. Patterson, this statement would further
persuade him that he should disregard state postconviction. Why worry about
it as an option when your attorney, with his experience, tells you he cannot
think of any claims you could pursue there?
Similarly dissuasive were Mr. Wall’s statements that Mr. Patterson’s state
remedies were exhausted. PCR88-89, 202. To a layperson unfamiliar with
federal habeas law, the statement that remedies were “exhausted” would be
interpreted according to its everyday meaning: a layperson would understand
that state remedies have been “completely used up.” See “exhaust”, p. 499,
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 12th ed. (Oxford University Press 2011).
Mr. Patterson had no reason to think that “exhausted” was a specialized term
that meant something technical about one of his claims in his direct appeal. Cf.
State Brief at 26-27.
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Sure, had Mr. Patterson consulted another attorney, he might have been
set straight on why state postconviction was important to him. But that misses
the point. We don’t expect laypeople to question their attorney’s advice—or
any professional’s advice—when circumstances give them no reason to. It
should be beyond debate that a reasonable person is not blameworthy for
following the advice of lawyer, doctor, or accountant, especially when there is
no indication the advice is suspect. And that’s precisely what Mr. Patterson
did: he followed Mr. Wall's advice and gave no thought to state postconviction.
Although that was a mistake, it should not be counted against him.
Mr. Wall’s advice also undercuts the notion that Mr. Patterson was not
diligent in pursuing relief. He was told he had a year to file, and he filed within
a year. He just followed his attorney’s advice. And, having watched his
criminal case take four years to get from charge to the end of direct appeal, Mr.
Patterson had no reason to believe filing sooner would somehow speed up the
process. More significantly, Mr. Patterson had no reason to believe he would be
prejudiced if he filed later in the year-long period. In light of how he was
advised, there is no basis to hold Mr. Patterson at fault for filing when he did.
In sum, Mr. Patterson was reasonably following his attorney’s advice
when he skipped state postconviction and instead filed a timely federal petition
near the end of filing period. The postconviction court’s determination to the
contrary were unreasonable, and under the facts of this case, improper on
motion for summary judgment. At this stage in the proceedings, the Court
must accept Mr. Patterson’s claim that Mr. Wall told him to proceed directly to
federal court. The only real question is whether, under these circumstances, a
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remedy short of declaring the PCRA unconstitutional will allow his claims to
be heard.
D.

Mr. Patterson’s claims were statutorily tolled.
There are two statutory bases for tolling. The first focuses on a state

impediment to filing, whether by Mr. Wall’s affirmative misadvice or the
unavailability of contract counsel to assist with filing. The second focuses on
new evidence that supports the tolling for only a few claims. Each is addressed
in turn.
1.

For purposes of the tolling provision, Mr. Wall’s misadvice must be
imputed to the state.

Mr. Patterson is entitled to statutory tolling under Utah Code §78B-9106(3) because Mr. Wall, as direct appeal counsel, he had an obligation to
correctly advise on postconviction matters that would follow the end of direct
review. The State seeks to avoid that conclusion for several reasons. The first
argument is that Mr. Patterson was correctly advised. That contention is
rebutted above. In short, a correct description of the state postconviction
process is meaningless when it is accompanied by specific advice to ignore that
state process.
Beyond this point, the State argues that any misadvice should not be
imputed to the state because the advice was not constitutionally defective. This
argument has several aspects. For one thing, the State focuses on when the
advice was offered. Pointing out that Mr. Wall did not advise Mr. Patterson
until after this Court denied review on direct appeal, the State relies on the fact
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that by that time, Mr. Patterson had no right to counsel, let alone effective
counsel. State’s Brief at 28-34. But that misses the point.
While Mr. Patterson had no right to counsel for discretionary review to
this Court or for postconviction, he did have the right to effective counsel in his
first appeal of right. And the State offers no counterargument to Mr.
Patterson’s contention that such appellate counsel must adequately and
accurately advise clients on what corrective processes are available to them
once the direct appeal has concluded. The authorities are consistent in that
view. See Opening Brief at 13-14.
The only wrinkle is that Mr. Wall gave this required advice after
discretionary review had been completed. But the timing of the advice does
not change the duty to offer it. The exact timing of the advice is irrelevant, as
long as it comes early enough to be useful. The duty to provide is what matters.
The State correctly observes that attorney misadvice is not typically
imputed to the state in some contexts, like civil rights litigation, even when the
attorney is a court-appointed public defender. But in postconviction matters,
error is imputed to the state when the attorney provides ineffective assistance
of counsel, even when counsel is retained. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
342-45 (1980).
It is irrelevant that Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), dealt with the
federal “cause and prejudice” standard. The point is that when a petitioner’s
claim is procedurally barred as a result of constitutionally defective
representation, that procedural bar should not keep the petitioner out of court
because the state was supposed to have provided effective assistance at that
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stage of the proceeding. Through this argument, Mr. Patterson does not assert
he was entitled to counsel throughout his postconviction litigation. His claim is
only that Mr. Wall, at the conclusion of his first appeal of right, was obligated
to adequately advise him about what he could do next.
Even if correct advice was not constitutionally required at the conclusion
of a direct appeal, Mr. Wall’s decision to volunteer the information obligated
him to provide correct advice. The State tries to avoid this conclusion by
suggesting that State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, was abrogated by Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). State’s Brief at 34 n.7. However, Padilla abrogated
only this Court’s holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require an
attorney to correctly advise a defendant about deportation consequences of a
plea. Rojas-Martinez remains good law about what rules apply when an
attorney volunteers advice he is not constitutionally required to provide. By
choosing to dispense such advice, counsel was obligated to dispense correct
advice under Rojas-Martinez.
Because counsel has both a legal and ethical duty to correctly advise a
client of other corrective processes available to the client, Mr. Wall’s incorrect
advice to Mr. Patterson was ineffective assistance that can be imputed to the
state, thus triggering the tolling provision in Utah Code §78B-9-107(3).
2.

The State’s failure to provide adequate contract counsel prevented Mr.
Patterson from filing a timely PCRA petition.

The State does not quarrel with Mr. Patterson’s claim that failure to
provide adequate contract attorneys could violate his right of access and,
therefore, establish a state impediment to filing a PCRA petition. Instead it
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argues that the contract attorneys were adequate, absent a showing of actual
prejudice.
However, the prejudice is manifest in the dismissal of all of Mr.
Patterson’s claims. It was and is his desire to seek relief under any legal theory
available to him. He filed a timely pro se petition in federal court, and he
would have filed one in state court had Mr. Wall not advised him otherwise.
Had contract counsel been available when he was preparing his federal
petition, they surely would have advised him to consider claims beyond what
Mr. Wall identified and would have made clear that he could pursue those
claims in federal court only after presenting them in state court.
The fact that the Department of Correction’s system has been found
adequate in other circumstances does not guarantee that it would still survive
scrutiny. Discovery is needed to fully develop this claim, but at this stage, the
court should accept Mr. Patterson’s statements that he was unable to access the
contract counsel prior to filing his petition.
The State argues that Mr. Patterson’s failure to seek out their help is like
a “healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy
of the prison infirmary.” State’s Brief at 39. This metaphor fails for two reasons.
First, Mr. Patterson stands in this metaphor as a sick individual. He needed
help and wanted help; he just didn’t know where to get it. Second, it is
inconceivable that the U.S. Supreme Court would approve of a prison that had
an infirmary but did not publicize to inmates how to get help there. The flip
side of the state’s analogy is a prison that has the best infirmary in the country
but does not inform inmates how to see a doctor. In this case, the State’s failure
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to tell inmates how to obtain those services undermines their effectiveness and
made them effectively unavailable to Mr. Patterson, violating his right of access
to the courts, and tolling the statute of limitations under §78B-9-107(3).
In the end, this claim turns on a factual dispute that was unreasonably
resolved against Mr. Patterson. The Court should remand to allow further
discovery and factfinding on this claim.
3.

Tolling of individual claims.

In addition to these tolling arguments that apply to all of Mr. Patterson’s
claims, at least two claims are timely because they rely on new evidence that he
could not collect as an indigent prisoner. Opening Brief at 39-41. The State
objects, claiming that Mr. Patterson has not shown that his indigency and
incarceration prevented him from getting that evidence earlier. State’s Brief at
41. But the State’s arguments do not make sense under the circumstances.
The statute at issue requires “reasonable diligence,” see Utah Code §78B9-107(2)(e), not “‘extreme diligence’ or ‘exceptional diligence.’” See Baldayaque
v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2003). With that in mind, Mr.
Patterson’s conduct is perfectly appropriate.
During his direct appeal, Mr. Patterson had no reason to be gathering
evidence. He was relying on counsel, and counsel’s failure to gather it then was
itself ineffective assistance. By the time his direct appeal had concluded, Mr.
Patterson had already been incarcerated for more than three years. R:113-14,
806. In prison, he had no money and could gather evidence only by sending
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requests through the mail. His diligence must be judged in light of these
conditions. See Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 2000).
As an indigent prisoner, there was no feasible way for Mr. Patterson to
get the expert opinion that is the foundation of one of his claims. Reasonable
diligence can’t require a petitioner to beg for free expert services from an expert
he does not even know about.
The DCFS report was practically out of reach as well. In theory, Mr.
Patterson could have eventually received it. But that conclusion requires the
consideration of many other factors that the district court did not address. As a
prisoner, did Mr. Patterson have the ability to learn of the report’s existence?
Did he have the ability to learn how to request it under GRAMA, including
what requirements he had to fulfill to even have access to a restricted juvenile
record? Did DCFS provides records without cost to prisoners? Did DCFS
provide juvenile records to prisoners at all? Even assuming the answer to all of
these questions is yes, how quickly could he have accomplished everything
necessary to get the report?
In light of the hurdles he would have to overcome to get it himself, it was
reasonable that he only received once he had the aid of counsel. Because the
consequences of a late filing are so severe, this court should construe this
provision liberally to allow inmates who lack the means to conduct
independent factual research to benefit from information that is discovered
much later by others who take an interest in the case. However, without factual
findings, it would be improper for this Court to conclude that he could have
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obtained it sooner. And for that reason, if this Court doesn’t allow that claim
to proceed, it should remand for the district court to resolve the matter.
E.

Mr. Patterson’s claims are entitled to equitable tolling.
Besides statutory tolling, Mr. Patterson should also benefit from

equitable tolling does despite the State’s various arguments against it.
One argument that State presents is that Mr. Patterson was correctly
advised. The fault with this argument is addressed above.
At another point, the State focuses on this Court’s rejection of common
law exceptions to the PCRA’s procedural bars. State’s Brief at 42-44. From that,
the State claims that this Court has already rejected equitable tolling. But that
conclusion only follows if you conflate the various procedural bars with the
statute of limitations. None of the common law exceptions to the procedural
bars addressed when it was proper to hear an untimely claim, see Hurst, 777
P.2d at 1037, so this Court’s rejection of those exceptions is irrelevant.
The State also argues against equitable tolling by asserting that the
PCRA enacted comprehensive set of limitations statutes and thus “occupied
the field,” while Congress did not. Based on that distinction, the State claims
that Congress “has not abolished [federal courts’] equitable powers” as the
PCRA has for state courts. State’s Brief at 44. But a comparison of statutes
shows that the premise of the State’s argument is wrong: the federal statutes
are just as comprehensive as the PCRA.
Like the PCRA, the federal statute of limitations begins to run from the
latest of several different events. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1) (state habeas); §2255(f)
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(federal postconviction); Utah Code §78B-9-107(2). One of those events is
when a conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A); §2255(f)(1). The
PCRA has a similar limitation, except that the PCRA is much more verbose in
spelling out when a conviction is final. See Utah Code §78B-9-107(2)(a)-(d).
Another event recognized in federal statutes is the recognition of a new right
by the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(C); §2255(f)(3). The PCRA
is the same. Utah Code §78B-9-107(2)(f). The federal statutes also recognize
the discovery of new evidence as a possible event. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(D);
§2255(f)(4). The PCRA is the same. Utah Code §78B-9-107(2)(E).
While the PCRA tolls the statute of limitations when state action
prevents a filing, Utah Code §78B-9-107(3), the federal statutes just list that as
another event from which the statute of limitations begins to run. 28 U.S.C.
§2244(d)(1)(B); §2255(f)(2). In the end, the only generally applicable provision
that isn’t shared is PCRA’s tolling for physical or mental incapacity. Utah Code
§78B-9-107(3). But such incapacity would generally form the basis for equitable
tolling under federal law. See, e.g., Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir.
2003). In short, the PCRA’s statute of limitations differ only slightly from those
in federal law. If the State’s theory were correct, the complex federal statutes of
limitations would “occupy the field” and preclude equitable tolling. But federal
courts allow equitable tolling. For the same reasons it is available there, it
should be available here.
A decision from this Court also implies the existence of numerous
tolling provisions is irrelevant to the determination of whether equitable tolling
should be applied. In Garza v. Burnett, the Court was asked to determine
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whether an unforeseen change in the law could provide a basis for equitable
tolling. 2013 UT 66, ¶1, 321 P.3d 1104. Under federal law, the statute of
limitations for a civil rights claim is the same as that for a state personal injury
claim. Id. at ¶5 & n.7. This Court concluded that a change in the law could
provide a basis for equitable tolling. Id. at ¶14. This decision is notable because
Utah has numerous statutory grounds for tolling a personal injury claim. See
Utah Code §§78B-2-104 through -114. However, there was no suggestion that
these various statutory grounds “occupied the field.” Clearly, equitable tolling
is available despite the availability of specified, statutory grounds.
The State’s last focus is Martinez v. Ryan. Mr. Patterson discussed that
case to show “how equitable principles can be used to excuse a procedural
defect in a first habeas petition.” Opening Brief at 22. After comparing the facts
in Martinez to those in this case, Mr. Patterson suggested that the similarity
justified equitable tolling. Id. at 23.
The State’s response misses the mark. The brunt of its argument centers
on the State’s assertion that Martinez is not applicable to state prisoners seeking
review of their Utah convictions in federal court. State’s Brief at 46-48. The
validity of that argument is questionable. See, e.g. Lafferty v. Crowther, 2:07-CV322, 2016 WL 5848000, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 5, 2016) (“The equitable rule
announced in Martinez is applicable in Utah pursuant to Trevino v. Thaler.”).
Regardless, Mr. Patterson was not asking this Court to implement Martinez, but
just to recognize that its reasoning justifies the application of equitable tolling
in this case, i.e. incorrect advice of counsel caused the petitioner to forfeit a
chance at state court review.
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Because equitable tolling is not statutorily prohibited, it should be
considered as an alternative to Mr. Patterson’s constitutional arguments. Like
the federal courts, this Court should hold that the PCRA’s statute of limitations
may be equitably tolled.
F.

Enforcing the statute of limitations would be an egregious
injustice.
If equitable tolling is not available, Mr. Patterson’s claims should proceed

under the egregious injustice exception. Yet, the State’s brief shows its
discontent with Winward and Gardner. It wants those case overruled, claiming
this Court was wrong to suggest there was some space between what relief the
PCRA permits and what relief courts can grant with their habeas power.
Nevertheless, while it wants those cases overruled, the State still criticizes Mr.
Patterson for failing to meet their strictures in his attempt to take advantage of
the egregious injustice exception.
The State’s first argument is that Mr. Patterson was properly advised and
thus has no reasonable excuse for delay. That has been addressed before, and
so the argument need no repetition.
The State’s next complaint is that Mr. Patterson’s suggested factors are
“cobbled together” from factors suggested by Winward and not independently
divined from some unspecified constitutional principle. State’s Brief at 55. It is
true that Mr. Patterson relied on factors that have been used previously. But
that is due to the nature of the egregious injustice exception. Prior to the
PCRA, this Court focused on the factors Mr. Patterson has suggested, like the
reason and length of the delay, and a petitioner’s diligence, to determine
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whether to excuse untimely filings. Beyond these pre-PCRA cases, there are no
relevant authorities to consult. There is certainly no case that says, “Here are
the factors that really matter if the Legislature ever takes over postconviction.”
Significantly, the State does not suggest that some essential factor has been
overlooked. It merely faults only the provenance of the factors cited. But what
mattered before still matters now, so if delay and diligence and other factors
Mr. Patterson cited were what this Court weighed in a pre-PCRA framework,
they are what this Court should consider again.
If Mr. Patterson’s proposed frameworks are inadequate, the State’s brief
suggests another one under which Mr. Patterson still would qualify. The State
writes that it would be an “egregious injustice” if “a convicted person [were
allowed] to go free because of technical noncompliance with the timeframes
set out for sentencing.” State’s Brief at 62. But this standard yields a corollary
more fitting in this context: it would be an egregious injustice for an innocent
petitioner to have his claims dismissed because of inadvertant noncompliance
with the timeframes set out for filing.
Mr. Patterson claims he is innocent, and a cascade of errors in his
original trial bury his innocence beneath a defective and unconstitutional
conviction. He has alleged numerous ways in which his attorneys failed to
expose defects in the case against him or present his defense. He was dissuaded
from taking the stand only because his attorneys bungled their response to a
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prosecutor’s improper and heavy-handed threat. 26 Mr. Patterson has now
obtained evidence that squarely contradicts a central point of his ex-wife’s
testimony by showing that he was the one who requested a divorce. And he has
now obtained expert evidence that would demonstrate why his step-daughter’s
highly-inconsistent testimony was most likely the result of undue influence and
post-hoc fabrication. And while he wanted to keep fighting his case, and did
everything he thought he needed to do, he was misled by his attorney.
Enforcing the statute of limitations would result in an egregious injustice.
G.

If there remains any doubt, Winward must yield to the
Constitution.
The State’s argument against the egregious injustice exception gets at the

internal contradiction in Winward. That case, like Gardner, recognized the
possibility that the PCRA infringed upon this Court’s habeas power. However,
it suggested that infringement was problematic only if a petitioner met some
yet-unspecified, but heightened, standard. Put another way, Winward suggests
that although the PCRA is unconstitutional, a petitioner can still gain relief if

The State criticizes Mr. Patterson’s suggestion that the prosecutor
misled trial counsel by threatening to use the Bishop to impeach him when he
knew he could not be called as a witness. State’s Brief 13-14 n.4. However, the
prosecutor admitted he talked to the Bishop just once, on the Saturday before
trial. The Bishop refused to talk without first consulting Church attorneys, and
the prosecutor made no effort to contact them. Then, on Monday, around the
time he rested his case, the prosecutor made his threat. R:656-59, 664-65. It is
highly improbable that he could have subpoenaed the Bishop to testify the next
day. Whether this threat was prosecutorial misconduct is a merits question the
district court should be allowed to reach.
26
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the petitioner is willing to meet the violation halfway by showing that, at least
in his case, the unconstitutionality will cause some egregious injustice to occur.
This contradiction is not tenable. To the extent the PCRA violates the
constitution, it is void. See, e.g., Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 2010 UT 8, ¶12,
228 P.3d 737 (Utah 2010). The PCRA can be saved, of course, if it can be
interpreted in a way that avoid the unconstitutionality, Utah Dep’t of Transp. v.
Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ¶23, 332 P.3d 900, or if its unconstitutional features can
be severed from the remainder of the Act, State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 83, ¶47, 199
P.3d 935.
The problem lies in two different parts of the PCRA. The first is in §78B9-102(1)(a), which proclaims that the PCRA is the “sole remedy” that
“replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or common law
writs.” The second is the bar in §78B-9-106(1)(e), which prohibits relief under
the PCRA for any claim that it deems untimely. Neither provision is
ambiguous, so the avoidance canon is irrelevant. See Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ¶24.
That means one of the two provisions must be severed. Looking at the PCRA
as a whole and its history, it seems most likely that the legislative preference
would be to sever the “sole remedy” provision—and return the statute to its
pre-2008 form—rather than remove the effect of the statute of limitations
completely. Cf. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶¶18-20, 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999).
One option not open to this Court, however, is that of rewriting the
PCRA to have it say something it does not. See State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶29,
424 P.3d 171. So Winward’s strictures cannot come from that. And the Court’s
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pre-PCRA case law regarding practice under the habeas clause is still intact.
None of it required what Winward requires.
In short, if none of Mr. Patterson’s proposed frameworks meets
Winward’s requirements, it is Winward that should yield. It may well be that
Winward presents a sui generis burden that has no basis in the law.
H.

The State misapplies the bar on previously litigated claims.
The last part of the State’s brief urges that several claims are also

procedurally barred under Utah Code §78B-9-106(1)(b). That provision
precludes relief on claims that were raised in prior proceedings. Relying on that
section, the State argues that several claims were properly dismissed regardless
of the time bar. State’s Brief at 80-88. Though the Court may reach these
arguments, it is not obligated to do so, and it may appropriately remand
without ruling on this issue.
The State is correct that the PCRA does not permit a petitioner to
relitigate claims that were presented before. The PCRA essentially implements
the principles of issue preclusion and collateral estoppel, legal principles that
were applied in postconviction proceedings even before the PCRA was
adopted. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d at 1036; U.R.C.P. 65B(i)(2) (1988).
Nevertheless, the State’s argument overreaches. It labels claims as
identical even though they rest on logically distinct grounds. And while the
State cites several cases to support its position, those cases do not illustrate the
contours of the bar.
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It appears only one appellate decision demonstrates how close claims
can be reached without triggering the bar: Lynch v. State, 2017 UT App 86, 400
P.3d 1047. Lynch involved a defendant convicted of using a truck to murder his
wife. Id. at ¶¶2-9. In a post-trial motion, Lynch unsuccessfully argued that his
trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to determine whether his truck was
drivable. Id. at ¶26. In his subsequent PCRA petition, Lynch again alleged
faulted his trial attorneys for failing to determine whether his truck was
drivable, and also for failing to determine whether his truck had certain
features the truck involved in his wife’s death had (a damaged grille, a “tow
hook,” and other features). Id. at ¶¶25-29. When the district court denied his
PCRA petition in its entirety, Lynch appealed. Id. at ¶16-17.
On appeal, the State argued that all Lynch’s claims regarding the truck,
including those claims about specific features of the truck, were precluded. The
State argued the bar applied because Lynch “thoroughly covered this in his
new trial motion in the criminal case where he argued that his trial counsel
were ineffective for fail[ing] to have important evidence examined and/or
challenged.” Id. at ¶25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals disagreed. “To the extent that Lynch’s failure-toinvestigate claim was based on the mechanical or operational capabilities of his
truck,” his claims were precluded under section §78B-9-106(1)(b). Id. at ¶29.
However, the claims regarding the existence of specific features of the truck
were not barred. Instead, the Court of Appeals examined those claims on their
merits. Id. at ¶¶29, 47-52.
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Lynch is instructive because it shows that two claims can be related yet
distinct, such that the previous presentation of one does not necessarily bar the
other under the PCRA. At a minimum, as long as the later claim does not
depend on a factual or legal theory that was presented and rejected, a claim is
not identical for purposes of Utah Code §78B-9-106(1)(b).
This is consistent with another relevant area of law that this bar is based
on: that of issue preclusion. Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “the issue
decided in the prior adjudication” must be “identical to the one presented in
the instant action” for there to be a preclusive effect. Moss v. Parr Waddoups
Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42, ¶23, 285 P.3d 1157. Issue preclusion will still
apply even if a claim is framed differently, as long as the underlying issue is
identical. And “issues are identical for res judicata purposes when a party
attempts to relitigate the factual question of why something occurred and the
newly alleged cause for the occurrence was rejected as a defense in a prior
action.” Fowler v. Teynor, 2014 UT App 66, ¶21, 323 P. 3d 594 (citing Harline v.
Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996)).
With this law in mind, the State’s arguments against Mr. Patterson’s
claims under §78B-9-106(1) (b) must fail. In Ground 1, Part 1 of his petition,
Mr. Patterson alleges that his trial counsel were ineffective because of how Mr.
Bushell, one his trial attorneys, handled his psychosexual evaluation. PCR492.
Specifically, it argues that Mr. Bushell should not have let Mr. Patterson’s
bishop talk with the doctor performing the psychosexual evaluation, and that
to the extent the bishop provided privileged material to the doctor, Mr. Bushell
was ineffective for allowing that material to be passed to the prosecutor.
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PCR492-93. Ground 2, Part 1 argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise this same issue on appeal. PCR498. In contrast, on Mr.
Patterson’s direct appeal, appellate counsel simply argued that trial counsel
were ineffective at trial for failing to raise the clergy-penitent privilege, and that
the privilege had not actually been waived. PCR681-98 Appellate counsel did
not address these pre-trial errors. These are distinct claims.
In Ground 1, Part 3 of his petition, Mr. Patterson alleges that his trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to verify that his bishop would actually
testify at the prosecution’s request. PCR495. In Ground 2, Part 3 of his
petition, he alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this
same issue on appeal. PCR499. In contrast, in the course of arguing that trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the clergy-penitent privilege at trial,
appellate counsel asserted that the prosecutor’s legal conclusion that the
privilege had been waived was false. PCR690. To the extent this can even be
considered as “raising” the issue, appellate counsel was focused on a different
factual predicate: whether the privilege was legally waived, not whether the
bishop would testify. These are distinct claims.
In Ground 2, Part 4 of his petition, Mr. Patterson alleges appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the district court’s findings in
the 23B proceedings that Mr. Patterson waived the clergy-penitent privilege.
PCR499. In Mr. Patterson’s reply brief, appellate counsel simply asserted that
the district court was wrong in the 23B proceedings to conclude that “Mr.
Patterson waived the clergy-penitent privilege by consenting to the having the
psychologist communicate with the Bishop.” PCR730. In other words,
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appellate counsel challenged the legal conclusion, not the factual finding that
led to the legal conclusion. Moreover, appellate counsel could not “raise” the
issue in the reply brief. To challenge the factual finding, appellate counsel had
to raise the issue in the opening brief. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ¶19, 122
P.3d 566; see also U.R.A.P. 24(c) (“Reply briefs shall be limited to answering
any new matter set forth in the opposing brief.”). Again, these are distinct
claims.
With respect to Ground 3, the State’s briefing mischaracterizes Mr.
Patterson’s claim. The claim is not that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by threatening to call Mr. Patterson’s bishop “without knowing what Patterson
had actually said to the bishop.” State’s Brief at 87. Instead, the claim in Mr.
Patterson’s petition is that it was prosecutorial misconduct to make the threat
while knowing the bishop “would not speak to [the prosecutor] or testify unless
[the prosecutor] first contacted the Church’s attorneys.” PCR502. Again, it is a
distinct claim.
On Ground 3, the State also argues that it should be barred because it
could have been raised on Mr. Patterson’s direct appeal. But that ignores how
the issue came up. It was not until 23B proceedings on direct appeal that the
factual predicate for the claim was even established in the record. When Mr.
Patterson’s direct appeal counsel tried to raise the different prosecutorial
misconduct claim, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected it, stating that “rule 23B
hearings are not the proper forum to preserve such claims.” State v. Patterson,
2013 UT App 11, ¶10 n.4, 294 P.3d 662 (2013). However, the claim can now be
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raised because the bar does not apply when “the failure to raise that ground
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Utah Code §78B-9-106(3) (a).

III. CONCLUSION
Despite the State’s arguments, Mr. Patterson has shown that his claims
should be heard based on several different theories. This Court should
therefore rule in his favor and remand this case to the district court so that his
claims can be considered on the merits.
DATED: February 8, 2019.
/s/ Benjamin C. McMurray

Counsel for Scott Patterson
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